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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on firms’ productivity and exporting decisions by analysing the role played by 
organizational choice aspects. Rather than setting up a vertically integrated structure, manufacturers may act as sub-
contractors in both domestic and foreign markets, and produce to satisfy the requirements of other firms. A very simple 
model is presented where the most productive firms self-select into exporting, while the least productive ones work as 
sub-contractors serving the domestic market only. These predictions are tested using a sample of Italian firms observed 
in the 1998-2003 period. The results of our estimates highlight a ranking of firms consistent with a priori expectations, 
and provide a clear indication that passive exporters (i.e. using sub-contracting in foreign markets) display lower TFP 
values as compared to direct exporters. Moreover, only the latter category exhibits higher pre-entry productivity levels 
and growth rates as well as higher post-entry TFP growth rates. Such findings are consistent with both the self-selection 
hypothesis and the learning by exporting explanation. 
 
JEL Classification: D21, F13, F14. 




In the last decade both media and academic research devoted an increasing attention towards 
phenomena  such  as  offshoring  and  outsourcing,  as  they  experienced  a  rapid  growth  in  both 
manufacturing and service sectors (Helpman, 2006). While the term offshoring refers to a strategy 
aimed at relocating some of the activities in foreign countries (either by creating subsidiaries or by 
relying to third party contracting), outsourcing is an organizational choice through which parts of 
the production process are contracted out to external providers (who can be located in the home 
country or in foreign markets). Theoretical analyses which make use of models with heterogeneous 
firms  enriched  with  incomplete  contract  theory  have  recently  appeared  (Antras  and  Helpman, 
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2004), helping to understand why firms prefer to remain vertically integrated instead of recurring to 
outsourcing strategies, on the one hand, and why they choose to enter the foreign markets instead of 
concentrating their activities in the home country, on the other hand. Empirical evidence on the 
determinants and on the effects of outsourcing and offshoring is still providing mixed results (see 
Olsen,  2006  for  a  comprehensive  survey)  as  far  as  manufacturing  is  concerned,  while  positive 
effects are found for the services sector. 
 This  paper  does  not  take  the  point  of  observation  of  the  firm  deciding  to  undertake 
outsourcing or offshoring avenues, but looks instead at its contractor, that is at firms who provide, 
at home or in foreign markets, intermediate or finished products to other firms. This change of 
perspective from the demand side to the supply side of outsourcing allows us to focus on a strategy 
that  is  broadly  defined  as  sub-contracting  or  “production  to  order”,  a  contractual  relationship 
standing  between  vertical  integration  and  vertical  separation.  Sub-contracting  is  a  production 
agreement that allows both outsourcers and sub-contractors to reduce substantially transaction costs 
with respect to using the spot market option and guarantees more flexibility than the full vertical 
integration  alternative.  Some  manufacturers  endowed  with  insufficient  resources  or  abilities  to 
expose themselves to the direct and tough competition in the market, can opt for sub-contracting in 
order to bypass a substantial part of pre-investments necessary to enter the market and to carry out 
marketing research.   
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate sub-contracting as an organizational choice 
strongly associated with firm’s productivity, and to incorporate it into the stream of the literature 
dealing with firms’ performances and internationalisation strategies. In doing so, we follow the 
theoretical approach which assesses the self-selection hypothesis based on the interplay of firm 
heterogeneity, unitary costs, and pre-investment effort. Sub-contracting is thus seen as a result of a 
self-selection process, where the most productive firms sell directly to  the market and the less 
efficient  ones  act  as  upstream  sub-contractors.  More  interestingly,  by  looking  at  “production 
orders”  from  abroad,  we  assess  the  performance  of  firms  which  are  characterised  by  different 
degrees  of  internationalisation.  Sub-contractors  receiving  orders  from  foreign  manufacturers, 
hereafter foreign sub-contractors, can be considered as a particular subset of exporting firms, which 
we label as passive exporters. As Greenaway and Kneller (2007, p. 149) pointed out, there “might 
be a difference between firms that are passive and active in their export decision. […]. For those 
firms that are passive, no pre-entry investments are made and productivity changes are likely to 
occur with the start of export sales”. Differently from direct (or active) exporters that need to incur 
all sunk costs for market research and the setting up of new distribution channels, passive exporters   3 
can bypass part of these investments, so as to lower the threshold productivity level required to 
make positive profits in foreign markets. 
Using a unique dataset on a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms observed for the 
years 1998-2003 we are able to disentangle, on the one hand, domestic and foreign sales and, on the 
other hand, sales to third manufacturing parties (sub-contracting) and sales that  reach the final 
market (either with or without the intermediation of wholesalers or retailers). 
We  thus  investigate  how  the  internationalization  and  internal  organizational  choices  are 
jointly related to firms’ performances. Similar to the empirical studies on the choice of exporting 
versus domestic production or versus foreign direct investment, we compute productivity measures 
for  all  firms  in  our  sample  and  then  use  them  to  compare  all  types  of  manufacturers.  First, 
productivity measures are regressed on current export activity and current domestic and/or foreign 
sub-contracting. Second, productivity is used as a left hand side variable in a regression relating 
performance  to  our  six  firms’  categories.  Third,  fully  exploiting  the  longitudinal  nature  of  our 
dataset, we test the self-selection hypothesis by looking at pre-entry differences in productivity 
levels and growth rates between “future export starters” and “never exporters”. Finally, we test the 
not mutually exclusive hypothesis that exporters increase their performance after entry by looking 
at the post entry productivity growth rates for (active) export starters as compared to the other 
categories  (passive  export  starters,  export  stoppers,  always  exporters,  never  exporters).  This  is 
known in the literature as the learning by exporting hypothesis (Bernard and Jensen, 1995 and 
1999), according to which the exporting choice allows firms to increase their productivity thanks to 
the new knowledge and expertise they are able to accumulate in foreign markets.  
Beyond confirming the presence of the well known export premia, the estimates show that 
sub-contractors are characterized by lower levels of productivity, a finding that we label as sub-
contracting discount. That means that, looking at the domestic market, firms not using the sub-
contracting channel turn out to be more productive than sub-contractors and, looking at sales in 
foreign countries, active exporters outperform passive exporters. 
Our results are also in favor of the view that active future exporters self-select into foreign 
markets. However, we find that there are no significant pre-entry differences in productivity levels 
and  growth  rates  between  passive  exporters  and  non-exporters.  Finally,  our  findings  show  that 
active export starters exhibit growth rates which are positive and significantly higher than the other 
firm categories, a results which is consistent with the learning by exporting hypothesis.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  sections  2  and  3  the  relevant 
theoretical  and  empirical  literature  is  reviewed  and  a  simple  model  which  links  a  firm’s   4 
performance  to  the  type  of  organizational  structure  chosen  in  domestic  and  foreign  markets  is 
sketched. Sections 4 and 5 present the dataset and the empirical results, while section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Sub-contracting as production to order: definitional issues and literature review 
As pointed out by Sharpston (1975) and Kimura (2002), the term sub-contracting includes a 
variety of (sometimes very different) sub-categories. In fact, as to the object of the contract, sub-
contracting can refer to the management of a phase of the production process (i.e. the assembling 
phase), or to the manufacturing of a (customized or non-customized) component (i.e. an engine) or 
of a finished product (i.e. a shoe). As to the contracting parties, the commissioning firm can be a 
producer or a retailer, and has generally a much bigger size than the other counterpart. Turning 
towards the relationship between the outsourcer and sub-contractor, they can either be part of the 
same business group, or they can be independent firms involved in a long-term contract or in a one-
shot relationship, and so on. In this paper, we follow the definition suggested by Sharpston (1975, 
p.94), according to which sub-contracting refers to: “all sales of articles which are ordered in 
advance, and where the giver of the order arranges the marketing”.  
While the distinctive feature of sub-contracting is that it allows the sub-contractor to avoid 
the marketing problems associated with outlets, brand names, advertising, market research, and so 
on, a second important aspect may concern the passive attitude of subcontractors, especially in 
foreign markets, towards activating learning processes. In fact these firms just fulfil production 
orders  where  the  product  characteristics  (i.e.  their  composition,  their  recipe,  their  tailoring  to 
different customer needs and different geographical final markets) are fully specified. As such, they 
are not directly  exposed to the foreign environment and cannot take benefit from information flows 
and  knowledge  spillovers.  For  the  aforementioned  reasons,  we  consider  subcontracting  as  a 
“passive  strategy”,  as  compared  to  the  alternative  choice  of  finding  an  outlet  for  the  own 
production by actively engaging in advertising and selling activities. 
Production  with  the  purpose  to  satisfy  the  request  of  a  contractor  is  a  widespread  and 
growing organizational choice. Kimura (2002) shows using Japanese data for the years 1966-1987 
that labor-intensive industries (textile and clothing) as well as industries manufacturing goods that 
are positioned backward in the vertical chain such as plastic, rubber, metal and machinery, were 
making  an  extensive  use  of  sub-contracting.  Such  a  strategy  is  pervasive  also  in  Italian 
manufacturing, where small firms are organised in “industrial districts”, and are specialised in 
particular  production  phases  by  working  as  sub-contractors  for  downstream  firms.  In  the  most 
recent years, such a form of production is increasing precisely for the same reasons that explain the 
increase of outsourcing, i.e. the spreading of ICT technologies, computer-aided manufacturing, the   5 
use of more flexible labour force, and so on. In fact, production to order may be considered as the 
de facto mirror image of outsourcing.  
The  causes  and  effects  of  sub-contracting  have  been  investigated  for  specific  industries 
(textiles,  construction,  electronics,  engineering  and  so  on).  Among  the  cross  section  analyses, 
Basile et al. (2003) included sub-contracting as an explanatory variable in a regression seeking to 
understand the determinants of internationalisation of a sample of Italian firms. This variable had a 
negative and significant sign suggesting that firms that are sub-contractors have weak marketing 
and risk-bearing abilities, and they are less prone to engage in export activities. In a similar vein, 
Sterlacchini (2001) found on a sample of Italian firms that the nature of firms as sub-contractors 
was depressing both their export behaviour and performance (in terms of export shares). Kimura 
(2002) found on a sample of Japanese firms active in the 1991-1994 period in machinery sectors 
that the probability of working as a sub-contractor was negatively related to size, foreign sales and 
technological capability.  
Academic research has not devoted too much attention to the performance effects of sub-
contracting for the sub-contractors (the supply side of the market), but focused mainly on the effects 
for outsourcers (i.e. the demand side). To the best of our knowledge, there are no available studies 
investigating  the  link  between  productivity  and  production  to  order,  and  analysing  the  latter 
strategy in both domestic and foreign markets. 
 
3. A simple stylised model with active and passive strategies 
Starting from the seminal empirical works of Bernard and Jensen (1995 and 1999), who 
found that exporters were more productive than non-exporting firms, theoretical models have been 
developed to show that internationalisation strategies, such as export activities and foreign direct 
investments,  are  due  to  a  combination  of  sunk  costs  and  heterogeneity  in  the  underlying 
characteristics of firms (Greeneway and Kneller, 2007). For example, Helpman et al. (2004), in a 
context  of  a  free  entry  monopolistic  competition  model,  CES  preferences,  and  iceberg 
transportation  costs,  and  Head  and  Ries  (2003),  in  a  much  simpler  context  of  quadratic  utility 
function and per unit trade cost, show that the firm’s choice to export, to undertake FDI activities, 
to engage in both strategies, or to serve the domestic market only, are due to a trade-off between 
sunk costs in the FDI alternative and trade costs in the export mode. If productivity is greater than a 
certain threshold, FDI turns out to be the best choice, followed in turn by export and domestic only 
strategies as long as firm productivity decreases. This basic set up has been used, integrated with 
the incomplete contracts theory, to investigate outsourcing and offshoring activities too (Antras and 
Helpman, 2004). As to the choice between offshoring insourcing (in this case only via FDI, since   6 
the export activity is not taken into consideration) and domestic insourcing, there is a trade off 
between the possibility to benefit from lower variable costs in foreign markets and the necessity to 
bear some fixed cost of installing a foreign activity abroad. Turning now towards the outsourcing 
decision, there is a bargaining between the outsourcer and the external contractor for the price of the 
specialised intermediate input to be delivered (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). By controlling the 
production  of  most  of  the  inputs  (low  contractual  input  intensity),  firms  might  incur  higher 
production costs, but by relying heavily on external suppliers (high contractual input intensity), they 
may suffer from agency problems. The model predicts a clear cut productivity range, with high 
productivity  firms  choosing  to  insource  abroad,  (i.e.  to  engage  in  FDI  by  settling  foreign 
subsidiaries to produce the intermediate input), while outsourcing abroad (i.e. the purchase of the 
intermediate input from foreign external suppliers), insourcing at home (i.e. vertical integration 
without  FDI)  and  outsourcing  at  home  are  the  other  strategies  in  correspondence  of  lower 
productivity levels. Tomiura (2007) jointly analyses the export-FDI choice for selling final products 
and the outsourcing choice for manufacturing the intermediate inputs in a simple model inspired by 
Helpman et al (2004) and Antras and Helpman (2004). As for the first option, the trade off is 
between  bearing  iceberg  transportation  costs  in  the  case  of  exports  and  undertaking  the  fixed 
investment required to build a plant and sell final products abroad. As for the outsourcing choice 
(analysed in this context with respect to foreign markets only), the trade off is between leaving a 
share of the intermediate input’s revenue in the case of an external contractor and bearing the fixed 
costs of settling a plant abroad for manufacturing the intermediate input. In addition to the usual 
preference  for  FDI  versus  exports  as  a  way  to  sell  final  products  in  foreign  markets  in 
correspondence of high productivity levels, the model foresees also that, for what concerns the 
intermediate  inputs,  more  productive  firms  engage  in  vertical  FDI  and  less  productive  firms 
outsource abroad by relying on external suppliers.  
In this paper, following a similar reasoning, we analyse the choice of firms to be vertically 
integrated at downstream stages
1, that is to sell directly their products, or, alternatively, to produce 
on the basis of orders which are collected from other firms. These two types of strategies can be 
pursued both in domestic and foreign markets. In the domestic market, the decision is driven by a 
trade off between the higher fixed costs of being vertically integrated and the portion of revenues, 
that, as a result of a bargaining struggle, must be given to the firms which buy the products in the 
case of the “production to order” strategy. In order to analyse the decision to serve the foreign 
                                                 
1 In the case of outsourcing the choice is between being vertically integrated at upstream stages or relying on an external 
provider of the input. Here, we look at the choice to be vertically integrated at downstream stages versus working as a 
sub-contractor that fulfils the order of a commissioning firm.   7 
market, we add per unit transport costs in both hypotheses (i.e. vertical integration and “production 
to order”), as well as an additional amount of fixed costs required to organize a selling activity 
abroad in the case of vertical integration. The very simple model which is presented below will help 
to illustrate the basic ideas.  
Following Head and Ries (2003), suppose that each firm i behaves as a monopolist facing 
the following inverse demand function for its product: Pi = 1- Qi . Marginal costs are equal to w/Ai, 
were w is the unit cost of labour (which is assumed to be the same for all firms) and Ai is a measure 
of firm i’s productivity level. In the case of (forward) vertical integration the firm must bear some 
fixed costs F, which can be thought of as a measure of the effort required to find an outlet for the 
production (i.e. commercial activities). In the case of “production to order”, the purchaser orders 
directly the good to firm i, and the two firms enter a bargaining activity in which firm i is giving up 
a portion of its per unit margin, u, in order to ensure itself an outlet for its production. The profits of 
the firm in the two cases are respectively: 
 πTO = [(1-w/Ai-u)/2)]
2    
 πVI = [(1-w/Ai)/2]
2-F. 
In the case of the decision to serve foreign markets, we add a per unit transportation costs t, 
which occurs in both production to order and vertical integration strategies. In the latter event, we 
must  consider  also  a  fixed  cost  component  Ff,  which  reflects  the  costs  of  organising  a  selling 
activity abroad. The profits are thus respectively: 
 πTOf  = [(1-w/Ai-u-t)/2]
2    
πVIf = [(1-w/Ai-t)/2]
2-Ff 
The four profit functions are plotted in figure 1. Since foreign activities are only rarely 
observed without a corresponding domestic activity, we plot the functions πTO (PTOhome) and πVI 
(VIhome) together with PTOforeign = πTOf + max (πTO, πVI) and VIforeign = πVIf + max (πTO, πVI), which 
means that profits in foreign markets (either through vertical integration or production to order 
strategies) are added to the profits of the most profitable option in the domestic market. In figure 1 
the following ranking emerges: firms associated with the highest productivity levels would choose 
both to export in foreign markets and to be vertically integrated, while firms associated with the 
lowest productivity levels would choose to serve the domestic market only with the “production to 
order” modality. At intermediate levels of productivity lie the other two strategies, that is to export 
with  the  “production  to  order”  modality  and  to  be  vertically  integrated  at  home
2.  Similarly  to 
Tomiura (2007) and Head and Ries (2003 and 2004), we have presented a truly minimal stylised 
                                                 
2 Incidentally, the same ranking would emerge by considering iceberg transportation costs and bargaining on the value 
of goods sold instead of ‘per unit’ parameters u and t.   8 
model which does not pretend to be a realistic representation of real world markets. The purpose of 
the model is to provide an intuitive explanation of the trade-off between unitary and sunk costs 
which drives export and organizational choices. Moreover, the model implies full specialization in 
one of the two internal organizational structures.  The fact that the same firm can well activate 
different production modalities
3 at the same time can be justified by allowing for differences in the 
‘bargaining’ parameter u or in the fixed cost Ff across different products and foreign markets.
4   
 
4. Data 
We employ firm level data from the 8
th and 9
th Capitalia surveys, that include all large 
Italian firms with more than 500 employees and select small and medium-sized firms with less than 
500 employes on the basis of a stratified sample. They contain accounting information from balance 
sheet as well as information on geographical location, exporting, sub-contracting and innovation 
activities. The 8
th wave covers the 1998-2000 period and contains data on 4680 firms, whereas the 
9
th wave provides information on 4289 firms for the years 2001-2003.  Our sample is restricted to 
firms belonging to the manufacturing sectors that are included in both waves and for which there is 
complete information on accounting data and exporting and sub-contracting activity. After standard 
trimming  procedures,  the  final  dataset  consists  of  a  panel  of  1537  firms
5.  Unfortunately, 
information on exporting and/or the amount of turnover from “production to order” is not available 
year by year but only for the entire three years period covered by each wave. Therefore, we do not 
know exactly the year in which firms enter or exit from export or sub-contracting status. 
 
4.1. Export 
Information on the exporting activity is provided by a direct question in the survey:  firms 
report whether they exported or not during the last three years. Panel A of table 1 displays the 
dynamics  of  manufacturers  in  and  out  of  the  exporting  activity.  Approximately  65%  of  firms 
always export (“always” exporter). Manufacturers never involved in exporting (“never” exporter) 
represent only 24% of the sample, thus meaning that all remaining firms exported at least once in 
the period 1998-2003.  Manufacturers that start to export in 2001-2003 period (“starter”) are only 
                                                 
3 For example, approximately half of the sub-contractors in our sample are characterized by partial forward integration, 
i.e. they simultaneously produce to order and directly to the market. Moreover, the large majority of firms which use 
sub-contracting channel in foreign markets are using it also in the domestic one (see table 4).  
4 For example, in countries in which it is difficult to set up a foreign commercial subsidiary, companies might well 
choose to wait for orders to be placed by local foreign firms. In a similar vein, for products where transaction costs are 
particularly high due to the presence of specific assets or high degrees of uncertainty, the hold-up problem may be 
relevant so that firms will prefer the integration strategy. 
5 In some cases we do not observe balance sheet data for all 6 years, so that our full sample includes 1537 firms and 
8787 observations. See data Appendix for more details.     9 
5% of the sample, and 5% are also the firms that export in 1998-2000 but cease this activity in the 
last period (“stopper”).  Therefore, only 10% of manufacturers change their exporting decision over 
the period 1998-2003, thus indicating a considerable persistence in the export status. 
 
4.2. Sub-contracting 
Firms report the percentage of turnover by production orders (“produzione su commessa”) 
over total turnover during the last three year period. Since this percentage is disentangled by the 
type  of  firm  which  commissioned  the  order,  we  can  identify  the  portion  of  production  orders 
received by the domestic economy and the one received by foreign firms. Two dummy measures of 
firm involvement in “production order” activities have been constructed, one for domestic activities 
and the other for foreign ones
6. It is worth noticing that a value equal to one for these dummies 
identifies manufacturers who are involved also in sub-contracting (domestic or foreign) but not 
necessary devoted exclusively to “production to order” activity
7 .   
Panel B of Table 1 reports transitions in and out of the sub-contracting status (both domestic 
and foreign). The majority of manufacturers do not change status over time, even if sub-contracting 
is characterized by a greater dynamism and by a lower persistence than the exporting activity: 65% 
are always engaged in sub-contracting (“always” sub-contractor) and 12% are never involved in this 
activity (“never” sub-contractor).  
Table 2 analyses in more details “production to order” dynamics by disentangling it into the 
domestic and foreign sub-contracting. We observe that changes in domestic sub-contracting activity 
are  accompanied  by  a  similar  dynamic  in  foreign  sub-contracting,  and  vice  versa:  58%  of 
manufactures that start sub-contracting activity at home, fulfil production orders also from foreign 
commissioners,  and  58%  of  firms  ceasing  domestic  sub-contracting  activity  also  stop  to  serve 
foreign market by “production order” mode.  There are few manufactures engaged in foreign sub-
contracting and not using the “production to order” mode at home. Conversely, a relevant fraction 
of firms are involved exclusively in domestic sub-contracting. 
                                                 
6 We decided to use dummies and not sales percentages since approximately 55% of  the reported percentages were 
taking values of 0 and of 100. We tried also different specifications of the sub-contracting activity, for instance, by 
raising the percentage of turnover by “production to order” required to be defined as a sub-contractor. Such  changes 
implied  slight  variations  in  the  differences  among  sub-contractors  and  not  sub-contractors,  without  modifying  the 
qualitative nature of our results.  
7 We do not consider as sub-contractors those manufacturers that exclusively carry out assignments by firms belonging 
to the same corporate group since they may simply reflect the fulfilment of ordinary intra-group activity. In addition, 
there are only 14 (12 in 9
th and 2 in 8
th) firms that answer not being an exporter but declare a positive amount of 
production orders from foreign manufacturers. In order to facilitate the comparison among the groups, we recode these 
firms  to  be  exporters.  Manufacturers  that  opt  to  fulfil  production  orders  from  abroad  thus  represent  a  subset  of 
exporters, which implies that the PTOforeign category in Figure 1 is not present in our dataset.   10 
Table 3 reveals to what extent the decision to export is associated with the option to serve 
the foreign markets by “producing to order”.  First, we observe that 72% of manufacturers that start 
exporting, begin also to be engaged in foreign sub-contracting, thus suggesting that serving foreign 
markets  by  “producing  to  order”  may  be  an  intermediate  step  that  avoids  incurring  the  entire 
amount of sunk costs. Second, 63% of firms that stop to export were serving foreign market through 
sub-contracting mode, thus indicating either a lower level of competitiveness or a short-run nature 
of this kind of production agreements. 
 
4.3. Classification of firms  
Since foreign sub-contractors are, by definition, exporters (see footnote 7), we can define six 
different categories of firms according to export, domestic and foreign sub-contracting statuses. We 
use the following notation. Firms exporting are indexed with X whereas firms serving only the 
domestic market are indexed with D. Manufacturers that sell in the domestic market via domestic 
sub-contracting  are  indexed  with  Sh  irrespective  of  whether  production  to  order  represent  the 
totality or just a portion of firm’s turnover. We index by Sf those exporters that adopt foreign sub-
contracting as an additional channel to serve foreign markets.
8 XSf (DSh) are exporters (domestic 
firms) which use the sub-contracting channel too but only to serve the foreign (domestic market). 
Manufacturers denoted as XSh export, but not via foreign sub-contracting, and are domestic sub-
contractors,  while  XSfSh  are  firms  that  export,  also  as  sub-contractors,  and  serve  the  domestic 
market,  totally  or  partially,  via  sub-contracting.  In  terms  of  the  firm  typology  of  Figure  1,  X 
corresponds to VIforeign, D corresponds to VIhome and  DSh corresponds, if the sales share of sub-
contracting  is  100%,  to  PTOhome  or,  in  the  case  of  partial  vertical  disintegration,  to  an  hybrid 
structure that stands between PTOhome and VIhome. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the above six types of firms over the entire period 1998-
2003. The majority of observations, 45%, belong to exporting firms engaged in both domestic or 
foreign sub-contracting. Domestic firms which use sub-contracting and exporting manufacturers 
which are not using sub-contracting at home or in foreign markets represent respectively 22% and 
18%  of  observations  in  the  sample.  “Vertically  integrated”  domestic  firms  represent  8%  of 
observations in the sample. Finally, as expected, there are few firms that implement an internal 
organizational choice at home and a different one abroad.  
   
 
                                                 
8 In other words firms not indexed by Sh (Sf) serve the domestic (foreign) market via a vertically integrated structure.   11 
4.4. Productivity Measures  
Our  measures  of  TFP  at  the  firm  level  are  constructed  by  estimating  a  two-factor 
logarithmic Cobb-Douglas industry specific production function
9, with value added (deflated with 3 
digit producer price index) as output and labour (labour costs deflated by wage index) and capital 
(measured as deflated book value) as inputs. In order to avoid the simultaneity problem between 
input decisions and productivity shock the semi-parametric technique developed by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) is implemented (see the Appendix). We thus consider the transmitted productivity 
component estimated by the model as a proxy for productivity. In order to purge our TFP index of 
industry and year effects we construct a relative measure by dividing productivity by the industry 
mean in the same year. The same procedure applies to labour productivity and size, the former 
being computed as the ratio of value added divided by the total employment, and the latter as the 
total number of workers.  
 
5. Empirical results 
According to our simple model, we expect to observe a positive selection for exporting 
activity with exporters being more productive and exhibiting and export premia as compared to non 
exporters. As far as the sub-contracting activity is concerned, we need to distinguish two cases.  
First, everything else equal (i.e. exporting and sub-contracting abroad) firms that sub-contract at 
home  are  expected  to  be  endowed  with  a  sub-contracting  discount  with  respect  to  “vertically 
integrated”  firms.  Second,  manufacturers  exporting  in  the  foreign  market  only  through  direct 
exports  are  expected  to  be  more  productive  than  firms  selling  abroad  as  a  response  to  foreign 
production orders. That is, active exporters should outperform passive exporters. 
 
5.1. Productivity comparisons 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics by exporting (panel A) and by sub-contracting (panel 
B)  types  over  the  entire  period  1998-2003.  Exporters  are  characterized  by  productivity  levels, 
measured by TFP and value added per worker, that are higher than non-exporters, both in absolute 
                                                 
9  We  are  aware  that  estimation  of  a  common  industry  specific  production  function  for  both  sub-contractors  and 
vertically integrated firms may bias our estimates of TFP because of differences in production technology or in selling 
prices. Sub-contractors may carry out phases of manufacturing characterized by lower content of value added or by 
different intensity in input usage. Firms opting for “production order” may sell at lower prices as compared to vertically 
integrated firms or industry average, due for instance to a weaker bargaining position. Unfortunately, the limited size of 
the sample does not allow us to consistently estimate separate production functions for sub-contractors and non sub-
contractors. Since we do not not know who are the commissioning firms (the demand side of sub-contracting) and the 
amount of output they purchased, we are not able to characterize an industry equilibrium and we are compelled to 
divide value added at current prices by a common deflator for all manufacturers in the same industry. See section 5.2 
for more discussion on this issue.   12 
and  relative  terms,  and  are  all  characterised  by  a  larger  size.  Firms  that  are  not  involved  in 
“production to order” (both domestic or foreign) clearly outperform sub-contractors in term of 
absolute and relative measures of productivity. As expected, sub-contractors are much smaller than 
non  sub-contractors,  thus  confirming  that  this  production  channel  is  mainly  activated  by  small 
manufacturers. 
Table  6  reports  relative  productivity  indices  and  relative  measures  of  size  for  the  six 
categories of manufactures defined in Section 4.3. Manufacturers exporting but not undertaking any 
kind of sub-contracting at home or abroad ( i.e. our X category) are clearly the biggest and the most 
productive category of firms, while firms serving only domestic market also by resorting to sub-
contracting channel (DSh) are the smallest and the least productive.  
Interesting results emerge from the analysis of the role of foreign sub-contracting.  Among 
exporters not engaged in domestic sub-contracting, those who fulfil foreign production orders (XSf 
category) are smaller and less productive than manufacturers not involved at all in this activity (X 
category).  This  can  be  due  to  the  fact  that  passive  exporters  have  to  bear  lower  pre-entry 
investments  to  serve  foreign  markets  (i.e.  the  productivity  threshold  level  to  self-select  into 
exporting is lower). Moreover, among exporting manufacturers working also with domestic sub-
contracting, those who fulfil foreign production orders (XSfSh category) are only marginally greater 
and more productive than manufacturers not receiving production assignments from abroad (XSh 
category).
10 Since XSfSh, XSh, and XSf types are hybrid forms, i.e. different combinations of the 
four firm categories depicted in Figure 1, it is not surprising that they exhibit relative TFP values 
which are not very dissimilar to the one recorded for domestic vertically integrated firms (D). 
The differences in productivity levels can be analysed by comparing the distributions of the 
estimated TFP of different firms’ types. Figure 2 shows that the cumulative distribution of exporters 
not involved in any foreign sub-contracting (X) clearly lies to the right of the one for XSf firms. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  of  first  order  stochastic  dominance  (see  the  Appendix  for  details) 
confirms that the cumulative distribution of active exporters first order stochastically dominates that 
of passive exporters. In a similar vein, Figure 3 shows that the cumulative distribution of domestic 
vertically integrated firms (D) lies to the right of the one for domestic sub-contractors (DSh), and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the former stochastically dominates the latter. Jointly 
                                                 
10 Descriptive statistics in Table 4 display that the two types of firms have similar shares of turnover due to domestic 
sub-contracting (54%). However, the export activity weights 37% of sales for the XSfSh category, of which 33% is due 
to foreign subcontracting, and 22% for the XSh type. Therefore, the TFP values are similar because the higher shares of 
domestic sales (24%) and direct exports (22%) in the XSfSh case jointly produce the same effect than the higher share of 
passive exports (33%) in the XSh case.   13 
considering the above two results, it appears that the sub-contracting discount is present both at 
home and abroad.  
With the aim of further investigating firms’ performances by export and sub-contracting 
activity,  Table  7  reports  estimates  from  regressions  of  the  logarithm  of  our  two  productivity 
measures and logarithm of size on dummies for export status, and for domestic and foreign sub-
contracting statuses. Area (dummies for geographical location in North-West, North-East, Center 
and South of Italy), year and 2 digit industry dummies have been included among the regressors. 
This modelling strategy follows the standard approach – see the recent survey by Wagner (2007, 
p.62)  –  for  the  computation  of  the  export  premia,  which  is  enriched  here  by  taking  into 
consideration the sub-contracting activity at home or abroad. The estimates show that exporters and 
vertically integrated firms (the omitted category) are always bigger and more productive than the 
other firm types. The results for foreign sub-contracting are less clear-cut, probably because in our 
dataset foreign sub-contracting is associated with an exporting activity (4208 observations) and 
with domestic sub-contracting (3986 observations).  
In  order  to  shed  more  light  on  this,  Table  8  reports  the  estimates  of  the  measures  of 
productivity and size on five of the six categories of firms (the excluded category is DSh). The first 
column shows that direct exporters are the most productive, followed in turn by the XSf, XSfSh and 
the D categories. Exporting firms working with sub-contracting at home only and domestic firms 
engaged in domestic sub-contracting are the least productive.  
As  pointed  out  in  footnote  9,  our  TFP  estimates  for  sub-contractors  may  be  downward 
biased, as the left hand side variable (i.e. value added) can be relatively lower due to their weak 
bargaining position. A first observation is that in the regression reported in Table 7, domestic and 
foreign sub-contracting activities have been included as dichotomous variables. This is a choice 
running against our results, since a lower value added can be reasonably expected only (or mostly) 
for  firms  exhibiting  high  sales  shares  due  to  “production  to  order”  activities.  In  a  set  of  not 
reported regressions, we included the sales share due to sub-contracting, together with its squared 
value, as additional explanatory variables. The coefficient of the former regressor is negative and 
significant, while the one for the quadratic variable is positive and significant. This latter result is 
clearly  not  consistent  with  the  “weak  bargaining  position”  story.  As  an  additional  check,  we 
included  among  the  right  hand  side  variables  the  sales  share  directed  towards  other  firms
11. 
                                                 
11  Capitalia  survey  includes  detailed  information  on  how  sales  are  distributed  among  retailers,  gross  retailers, 
distribution channels, direct sales to families and to other firms.   14 
Although a weak bargaining position would imply a negative impact of such a proxy, its coefficient 
turned out to be not significantly different from zero.
12       
 
5.2. TFP and transition dynamics 
Figure 4 shows the pattern of relative TFP measures for four types of firms: manufacturers 
that exported in both periods (“always”), firms that never exported (“never”), firms that started to 
export in 2001-2003 period (“start”) and manufactures that exported in 1998-2000 but not in 2001-
2003 (“stop”). Always exporters are found to be the most productive, while firms never exporting 
are the least productive. “Starters” exhibit similar productivity levels than “stoppers” in the 1998-
2000 period, but performance is increasing for the former and reducing for the latter through time. 
Panel  B  highlights  that,  within  the  export  starters  category,  only  active  exporters  are  steadily 
increasing productivity, while passive exporters show a flat pattern.  
Panel A of Figure 5 shows the pattern of TFP over time for the transition in and out of the 
sub-contracting activity, here defined as domestic plus foreign sub-contracting. As expected, firms 
always (never) engaged in production to order are the least (most) productive, and “starters”, i.e. 
firms  beginning  sub-contracting  are  less  productive  than  “stoppers”.  However,  by  limiting  the 
attention to domestic sub-contracting only, panel B of Figure 5 shows that the differences between 
starters and stoppers are much smaller, suggesting that part of the differences in productivity may 
be  associated  with  the  transition  in  and  out  of  the  foreign  sub-contracting  activity.  Therefore, 
differently from the pattern shown by export starters and export stoppers in Figure 4, in the case of 
sub-contracting there is not a clear dynamic pattern for entrants and exitors. 
In  table  9  we  test  the  self-selection  hypothesis  by  looking  at  the  sub-sample  of  export 
starters (83 firms) and never exporters (375 firms). The left hand side variables are past productivity 
levels and productivity growth rates, and explanatory variables are firm types. The coefficients for 
export starters are larger than the coefficients of never exporters, especially for active exporters 
(Type 1 firms, i.e. exporters which do not make use of the foreign subcontracting channel), and in 
some cases the differences are statistically significant. This suggests that active export starters in 
the 2001-2003 period were more productive than never exporters in the 1998-2000 period already, 
when both types of firms where serving the domestic market only. Such a result is not found for 
passive export starters, who do not exhibit a significantly different pattern as compared to never 
exporters. The regressions reported in the last two columns use 1998-2000 productivity growth 
                                                 
12 Finally, a proxy for the number of firms using outsourcing in the same industry in which the firm is active is included 
only for the subsample of firms participating to the 9th wave (this information is not available for the 1998-2000 
period). This would capture the effect of the demand side of outsourcing. While the variable is found, according to 
expectations, to impact positively on productivity, the other results are virtually unchanged.     15 
rates as dependent variables. The positive coefficient for active export starters, and the fact that the 
difference with respect to the coefficients for never exporters are significantly different from zero, 
show that the former were outperforming the latter, in terms of productivity growth rates, in the 
years prior to entry in foreign markets.   
Table 10 tests the learning by exporting hypothesis by looking at post-entry growth rates of 
productivity for the sub-sample of firms that were not exporting in the 1998-2000 period. Active 
export starters impact positively on TFP growth, and the difference with respect to the coefficient 
associated to the never exporting category  is significant. Again, passive exporting strategies (Type 
2) are not leading to significantly higher TFP growth, suggesting that firms who engage in foreign 
subcontracting are not benefiting from learning by exporting. 
Finally,  table  11  jointly  takes  into  consideration  the  effects  of  exporting,  foreign  and 
domestic subcontracting activities on TFP growth for all the firms in the sample. The first two 
columns, consistently with the results of table 10, show that active export starters increase their TFP 
more than never exporters (the omitted category). The coefficient for export stoppers is negative, 
according to expectations, but it does not reach a satisfactory level of significance. In a similar vein, 
in column 3 there is evidence that stopping to serve as subcontractors in domestic markets fosters 
productivity. The last two columns show that the positive impact of active exporting strategies on 




6. Conclusions  
Manufacturers typically choose in which markets to be active and how to serve them. For 
example, they can decide to remain confined within the national borders or to expand their activities 
abroad. In both cases, they can act as (forwardly) vertically integrated structures and/or as sub-
contractors that fulfil production orders placed by commissioning firms. 
This paper considers both sub-contracting and exporting as the results of a self selection 
process. A very simple model illustrates how the different internationalisation choices and internal 
organizational structures are related to the trade-off between unitary costs (required to reward the 
outsourcing firm that purchases the goods in the case of sub-contracting and to ship the goods 
abroad  in  the  presence  of  an  export  activity)  and  fixed  costs  (required  to  organize  the  selling 
activity  in  domestic  and  foreign  markets).  According  to  the  model,  the  most  productive  firms 
                                                 
13 As shown in Table 4, the XSfSh category accounts for 45% of observations. Since the results reported on the first two 
columns  of  Table  11  are  not  duly  taking  into  account  the  subcontracting  activity  at  home,  the  estimates  of  the 
coefficients relative to the Type 2 category could be potentially biased downards.    16 
should select active exporting strategies, while the poorest performers should act as sub-contractors 
in  the  domestic  market.  The  other  two  options,  i.e.  using  the  sub-contracting  channel  to  serve 
foreign  markets  and  being  vertically  integrated  at  home,  are  associated  with  intermediate  TFP 
values. Using a large dataset on Italian manufacturing firms observed for the years 1998-2003, we 
obtain results consistent with theoretical expectations. Descriptive statistics of estimated TFP levels 
display a productivity ranking where active strategies are found to be clearly superior to passive 
ones,  and  tests  of  stochastic  dominance  as  well  as  appropriate  regression  analysis  confirm  the 
presence of an export premia and of a sub-contracting discount.  
Looking at the dynamics of firms’ types across the two periods under observation (1998-
2000 and 2001-2003), we found that persistent exporters (persistent sub-contractors) are associated 
with the highest (lowest) TFP level, while both starting to export and, to a lesser extent, stopping to 
sub-contract have a positive impact on performance. The pre-entry and post-entry TFP growth rates 
confirm both the self-selection hypothesis, according to which more productive firms go abroad, 
and  the  learning  by  exporting  hypothesis,  according  to  which  export  entrants  become  more 
productive after entry in foreign markets, but only for active exporting strategies.  
Overall,  our  results  show  that  sub-contracting  matters.  In  our  dataset,  exporters  and 
domestic  firms  which  do  not  use  such  a  channel  cover  only  18%  and  8%  of  observations, 
respectively,  while  a  domestic  (foreign)  sub-contracting  activity  is  found  for  72%  (48%)  of 
observations. Neglecting such a pervasive phenomenon in empirical studies, that is considering 
passive  and  active  export  behaviour  as  two  undifferentiated  strategies,  could  seriously  bias  the 
results.  Beyond  sheding  light  on  an  important  and  under-explored  topic,  such  as  the  role  link 
between performance and organizational choice, our results have important policy implications. For 
example, they suggest that policies of export promotion or of the “picking the future winner” type 
should carefully take into account the modality with which firms choose to serve domestic and 
foreign markets.   17 
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Table 1: Transition matrix in and out of exporting (panel A) and sub-contracting activities (panel B). 
Panel A    Panel B 
  Export in 
2001-2003 
No export in 
2001-2003 






























Note: Number of observations in parenthesis. 
 
Table 2: Type of domestic and foreign sub-contractors by transition patterns. 
        Domestic Subcontracting 
Foreign Subcontracting 
Start  Stop  Never  Always  Total 
Start  97  1  13  89  200 
Stop   2  124  19  71  216 
Never  56  70  206  261  593 
Always  11  19  7  491  528 
Total  166  214  245  912  1537 
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Table 3: Firms by export and by foreign sub-contracting transition dynamics. 











Start  60  -  -  140  200 
Stop  -  48  -  168  216 
Never  23  28  375  167  593 
Always   -  -  -  528  528 
Total  83  76  375  1003  1537 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics by firm’s type.  
  X  XSf  D  XSh  XSfSh  DSh 
Number observations  1586  222  672  404  3986  1917 
Percentage  18%  3%  8%  5%  45%  22% 
Sales share of domestic 
sub-contracting 






Sales share of foreign sub-
contracting 
-  58% 
(35.12) 

















Note:  Standard  deviations  in  parenthesis. 
†  This  share  includes  sales  from  direct  export  plus  sales  from  foreign  sub-
contracting. Information of the percentage of exports over turnover for the period 1998-2000 is not available.  
 
 
Table 5: Firms’ characteristics by export status (Panel A) and sub-contracting status (Panel B). 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Exporters  Non exporters  Sub-contractors  Non Sub-contractors 


























































Table 6: Firms’ characteristics by export status (Panel A) and by sub-contracting status (Panel B). 
    Exporting firms    Non exporting firms 
   




























    XSfSh    XSh    XSf    X    DSh    D 






  .97 
(.36) 
  1.00 
(.32) 
  1.17 
(.55) 
  .86 
(.25) 
  1.00 
(.49) 






  .93 
(.37) 
  .96 
(.42) 
  1.12 
(.56) 
  .90 
(.34) 
  1.02 
(.68) 






  .77 
(.99) 
  1.05 
(2.11) 
  2.16 
(4.76) 
  .42 
(.41) 
  1.00 
(3.25) 
N° observations    3986  404    222    1586    1917    672 
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Figure 2: Comparison of  cumulative distribution functions of estimated TFP for exporters 
with (XSf) and without foreign sub-contracting (X). 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of cumulative distribution functions of estimated TFP for domestic 
vertically integrated firms (D) and domestic firms engaged in sub-contracting (DSh). 
(a) 
Cumulative distributions functions of estimated TFP for 
exporters with and without foreign sub-contracting 
(b) 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-
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Table 7: Estimates of export premia and sub-contracting discount. 
Dependent variable  lnTFP   ln(Va/L)   lnSize  
Exporting  0.142***  0.094***  0.585*** 
  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.035) 
-0.111***  -0.087***  -0.291***  Domestic  sub-contracting 
(0.011)  (0.014)  (0.031) 
-0.012  -0.001  -0.168***  Foreign  sub-contracting  
(0.012)  (0.015)  (0.035) 
Constant  0.864***  3.746***  3.269*** 
  (0.019)  (0.029)  (0.051) 
Observations  8787  8787  8787 
R-squared  0.65  0.15  0.12 
Note: Robust standard error in parenthesis. All regressions include 2 digit industry dummies, year dummies and  
geographical dummies. ***  significant at 1%,**  significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
 
Table 8: Productivity measures and firm’s type. 
Dependent variable  lnTFP   ln(Va/L)    lnSize  
























XSh  0.094*** 
(0.017) 










Observations  8787  8787  8787 
R
2  0.65  0.15  0.12 
Implied differences       
X-XSf  .124 [.000]  .136  [.000]  .352 [.000] 
X-XSfSh  .130 [.000]  .097 [.000]  .492 [.000] 
XSf -XSfSh  .006  [.770]  -.039 [.156]  .141 [.044] 
XSf -D  .0271 [.280]  -.025 [.459]  .336 [.000] 
XSfSh-D  .0213 [.207]  .014 [.537]  .195 [.000] 
XSfSh-XSh  .0429 [.009]  .071 [.000]  .009 [.838] 
D-XSh  .0216 [.329]  .057 [.036]  -.186 [.002] 
Note: Robust standard error in parenthesis. P-values in square brackets.  All regressions include 2 digit industry 
dummies, year dummies and  geographical dummies. ***  significant at 1%,**  significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. The omitted category is DSh. 
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year
Always Exporting Start Exporting














1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
year
Start Exporting & f sub Start Exporting & no f sub
(a) 
Transition in and out of exporting 
                                             (b) 
Export starters with and without foreign sub-contracting 
 
Note: Type 1: export starters without foreign sub-contracting; Type2: export starters with foreign subcontracting. 
 


























   
(a) 
Transition in and out sub-contracting (domestic or foreign). 
(b) 
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Table 9: Pre-entry differences  in productivity. 
 
  Productivity levels  Productivity growth rates 
















0.994***  1.030***  1.041***  3.528***  3.569***  3.642***  0.047  0.109*  Start exporting Type 1 
(0.097)  (0.089)  (0.094)  (0.179)  (0.185)  (0.176)  (0.060)  (0.059) 
0.917***  0.937***  0.885***  3.548***  3.599***  3.583***  -0.031  0.032  Start exporting Type 2 
(0.056)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.108)  (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.042)  (0.041) 
0.893***  0.890***  0.850***  3.541***  3.566***  3.542***  -0.046  -0.006  Never exporters 
(0.046)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.086)  (0.033)  (0.030) 
Observations  458  458  458  458  458  458  458  458 
R-squared  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.07  0.09 
Test                 
Type 1= never exporting  [0.31]  [0.11]  [0.04]  [0.93]  [0.99]  [0.50]  [0.09]  [0.04] 
Type 2= never exporting  [0.45]  [0.21]  [0.34]  [0.89]  [0.52]  [0.43]  [0.62]  [0.21] 
Type 1= Type 2  [0.45]  [0.31]  [0.11]  [0.90]  [0.84]  [0.70]  [0.20]  [0.21] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values in square brackets. All regressions include 2 digit industry dummies, year dummies and geographical 
dummies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample includes firms that do not export in 1998-2000.  
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0.148**  0.060  0.224***  0.061  Start exporting Type 1 
(0.066)  (0.052)  (0.073)  (0.059) 
0.028  -0.009  0.079  -0.025  Start exporting Type 2 
(0.049)  (0.037)  (0.052)  (0.042) 
Never exporting  0.021  -0.000  0.075**  -0.002 
  (0.034)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.028) 
Observations  359  386  359  386 
R-squared  0.11  0.08  0.13  0.09 
Test         
Type 1 = never exporting  [0.02]  [0.21]  [0.02]  [0.21] 
Type 2= never exporting  [0.83]  [0.75]  [0.92]  [0.44] 
Type 1= Type 2  [0.05]  [0.20]  [0.03]  [0.13] 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  *  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  *** 
significant  at  1%.  All  regressions  include  2  digit  industry  dummies,  year  dummies  and 
geographical  dummies.  The  sample  includes  firms  that  do  not  export  in  1998-2000.  The 
number of observations does not coincide with number of starters and never exporting, i.e. 






Table 11: Post-entry and post-integration growth rates. 
 












0.117**  0.140**      0.108*  0.135**  Start exporting Type 1 
(0.057)  (0.066)      (0.059)  (0.067) 
-0.000  0.001      0.004  0.003  Start exporting Type 2 
(0.032)  (0.037)      (0.032)  (0.037) 
-0.035  -0.019      -0.036  -0.021  Stop exporting 
(0.030)  (0.033)      (0.030)  (0.033) 
0.017  0.014      0.015  0.013  Always exporting 
(0.016)  (0.018)      (0.016)  (0.018) 
    0.032*  0.018  0.029  0.014  Stop Domestic Sub-contr. 
    (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
    0.027  0.020  0.023  0.015  Never Dom. Sub-contr. 
      (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
    0.006  -0.004  0.002  -0.007  Start Domestic Sub-contr. 
    (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.022) 
0.042*  0.064**  0.033  0.063**  0.026  0.056*  Constant 
(0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
Observations  1233  1233  1233  1233  1233  1233 
R-squared  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 All regressions include 2 digit industry dummies, year dummies and  geographical dummies. The omitted categories are “never 
exporting” and “always domestic subcontractor”.  The number of observations does not coincide with the number of firms in 




Our original sample contained 1847 firms. We retained those firms for which we observe in both 
waves  balance sheet data and information on exporting and subcontracting, and we dropped firms 
that were not belonging to manufacturing sectors, i.e. firms in the classes 10, 23 and 39 of Ateco 
91, two digit classification. The following trimming procedure, to get rid of firms which might have 
implemented merging or de-merging activity, was adopted: firms with annual growth rates in value 
added per worker, i.e. Va/L, greater than 100% and/or lower than –50% have been excluded. 
 
Table A.1: Original sample and retained firms. 
  Original sample  After trimming procedure 
Number of firms  1847  1537 
Number of observations  11082  8787 
 
TFP Estimation 
We assume a two-factor industry specific production function. 
it it it it it K L Y η ω β α γ + + + + = ln    
where Yit is valued added, Lit is deflated labour cost and Kit is capital.  ηit is a iid component and  ωit 
is the transmitted component that is used as a measure of productivity. By using intermediate inputs 
to control for correlation between input and unobserved productivity, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
semi-parametric method solves the problem of simultaneity. This procedure was implemented using 
the levpet STATA procedure (see Petrin et al. (2004)). In order to have enough observations to 
employ  this  procedure  we  estimated  industry  specific  production  functions  for  13  “macro” 
industrial sectors instead of the 20 two digit manufacturing classes. 
 
Table A.2: Industry aggregation adopted for the estimation of production functions. 






15 – Food and beverages  679  1  679 
17 – Textiles  714  2  1026 
18 – Clothing  312  2   
19 – Leather  379  3  379 
20 – Wood  336  4  336 
21 – Paper products  267  5  490 
22 – Printing and publishing  223  5   
24 – Chemicals  401  6  401 
25 – Rubber and plastics  500  7  500 
26 – Non metal minerals  558  8  558 
27 – Metals  250  9  1502 
28 – Metal products  1252  9   
29 – Non-electric machinery  1387  10  1387 
30 – Office equipment and computers  28  11  732 
31 – Electric machinery  348  11   
32 – Electronic material  194  11   
33 – Medical apparel and instruments  162  11   
34 – Vehicles  154  12  210 
35 – Other transportation  56  12   
36 – Furniture  587  13  587   27 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
In  order  to  test  whether  a  cumulative  distribution  F(z)  first  order  stochastically  dominates  a 
cumulative distribution G(z) we perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sided and one sided tests.   
The two sided tests considers the following hypothesis: 
0 ) ( ) ( . 0 ) ( ) ( : 0 ≠ − ℜ ∈ ∀ = − z G z F vs z z G z F H  for some z ℜ ∈  
The one sided tests considers the following hypothesis: 
0 ) ( ) ( . 0 ) ( ) ( : 0 > − ℜ ∈ ∀ ≤ − z G z F vs z z G z F H  for some z ℜ ∈  
The cumulative distribution F(z) stochastically dominates (i.e. is to the right of) G(z) if the null 
hypothesis  in  the  two-sided  test  is  rejected  (the  two  distributions  are  not  equal)  and  the  null 
hypothesis in the one-sided test is not rejected . For further details see Delgado et al. (2002). 
 
 
 